Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A critical review of the evidence by Axel Dreher
 
 
 
Does the IMF cause moral hazard? A 
critical review of the evidence 
 
 
Axel Dreher
§ 
 
First version: January 2004 
This version: December 2004 
 
 
 
Abstract  
The paper provides a critical review of empirical studies on IMF induced moral hazard. Taken 
together, there is considerable evidence that the insurance provided by the Fund leads to 
moral hazard with investors in bond markets, while moral hazard in equity markets has so far 
not been convincingly tested. Debtor moral hazard has much less frequently been 
investigated, and the counterfactual is more difficult to construct. There is, however, evidence 
that debtor governments’ policies are negatively influenced by the insurance. Their policies 
are more expansive leading to higher probabilities of IMF programs and shorter inter-
program-periods. 
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1. Introduction  
In recent years the International Monetary Fund has come under increased scrutiny 
and attack. Its forecasts have been shown to be comparatively poor (Brunner and Meltzer 
1990, Table 4.5) and biased in favor of optimism.
1 Its policy conditions have frequently been 
criticized as inappropriate and ineffective.
2 The growth of IMF staff does not seem to be 
related to the “need” for balance of payments credits (Vaubel 1996). The Fund has been 
shown to be an almost continuous provider of aid to a few dozens of developing countries and 
emerging market economies. While the average size of IMF loans has gone up in recent years, 
the number of countries borrowing from the Fund decreased. 
Considerable attention has also been paid to the question whether the IMF contributes 
to moral hazard, a hypothesis originally proposed in Vaubel (1983). In principle, moral hazard 
arises when the provision of insurance leads the insurant to take actions that increase the 
probability of bad outcomes. IMF lending may be interpreted as (subsidized) income 
insurance against adverse shocks. The insurance cover induces the potential recipients to 
lower their precautions against such damages (or even to intentionally generate a crisis). This 
form of moral hazard may be called “direct moral hazard” because it looks at the behavior of 
the direct recipients of insurance payments – the governments of the member states (Dreher 
and Vaubel 2004b). It ought to be distinguished from indirect moral hazard effects on the 
lending behavior of creditors, i.e. the “bailout” of foreign bondholders, banks etc.  
IMF lending provides insurance to those creditors as well. If markets refuse to roll 
over maturing debt, the Fund, knowing that restructuring is costly, provides resources that can 
be used to finance investors’ exit. Since investors take this into account when deciding 
whether and where to invest, allocation of credit becomes distorted, increasing the risk of 
future crises.
3 
Whether IMF lending indeed raises moral hazard with creditors is subject to heated 
discussion since the bailout of Mexico in 1995, where the IMF approved loans amounting to 
18 billion US$. Proponents of the moral hazard-hypothesis attribute the decline in emerging 
markets bond spreads and the pronounced increase in international capital flows over the 
period 1995-97 to this huge bailout-package. According to them, bailout expectations 
 
1 For a summary see Vaubel (1991: 235f.). 
2 E.g., International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (1999), Boockmann and Dreher (2003), Dreher 
and Vaubel (2004a). 
3 According to Calomiris (1998), this form of moral hazard is the most pernicious one, since it removes 
incentives for foreign banks to avoid lending to high-risk countries.   3
 
                                                
accumulated slowly over the 1990s as sovereign bond markets developed and bonds were not 
restructured during crises until the end of that decade (e.g. McBrady and Seasholes 2000). 
They became more pronounced after further large lending programs for emerging market 
economies facing financial crises, including Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, Russia and 
Brazil. According to the proponents of the moral hazard hypothesis, finally, the IMF’s failure 
to prevent the Russian default in 1998 is likely to have substantially reduced moral hazard.
4 
However, this view also has its critics. As Nunnenkamp (1999) and Lane and Phillips 
(2000) argue, IMF resources are not large enough to generate serious moral hazard. Creditors’ 
losses thus by far exceed the potential value of IMF loans (Mussa 2002). According to Jeanne 
and Zettelmeyer (2001) the subsidy implicit in IMF bailout packages is too small to induce 
significant moral hazard.
5 With respect to capital flows, a huge share of the increase to 
emerging markets following the Mexican bailout is due to foreign direct investments, which 
are less likely to benefit from IMF bail-outs as are bond flows and bank lending (Noy 2004). 
In the end, whether or not the IMF induces moral hazard is an empirical question. A 
huge amount of research has recently tried to shed light on that topic – Table 1 in the 
Appendix provides an overview. This paper critically reviews what we know about the moral 
hazard of IMF lending. While Section 3 focuses on debtor moral hazard, the next section 
deals with the question whether the IMF contributes to moral hazard with investors. The final 
section provides a short summary and suggestions for further research. 
 
2. Does the IMF cause moral hazard with creditors? 
Most studies examining possible IMF induced moral hazard focus on moral hazard 
with creditors. But how can creditor moral hazard be measured? As described in the 
introduction, insurance provided by the Fund might induce lenders or investors neglecting the 
risk of their engagement. This reduction in perceived risk would then affect the behavior of 
prices of bonds and equity.
6 Most empirical studies focus on the former. They consider IMF-
related events likely to change lenders’ perceptions about the risk of their engagement. 
 
4 It is interesting to note that ex post returns on emerging markets bonds peaked in 1994-97 and declined 
substantially after the Russian crisis in 1998 (Klingen, Weder and Zettlemeyer 2004). 
5 Haldane (1999) calculates the wedge between the costs of IMF borrowing and risk adjusted spreads for eight 
countries, finding an implied subsidy somewhat greater than Jeanne and Zettelmeyer. 
6 This is to some extent related to the literature on the IMF’s role in catalyzing financial flows. For example, 
Mody and Saravia (2003) found that the IMF’s effect on a country’s market access depends on fundamentals. 
For an excellent summary of this literature see Bird and Rowlands (2002).   4
 
Unexpected bailouts, for example, might increase the perceived probability of future bailouts. 
If investor moral hazard exists, this should be reflected by bond yields. Similar tests have 
been applied to equity markets. While those studies will be the focus of Section 2.2, the next 
section deals with moral hazard in bond markets. 
 
2.1. Evidence from bond markets 
In principle, the following tests have been proposed to analyze creditor moral hazard 
in bond markets: 
If (for given fundamentals) future bailouts seem to become more likely, 
-  do bond spreads decrease? 
-  are more or longer-term funds flowing to emerging markets? 
-  do countries where bailouts are more likely receive more or cheaper capital? 
-  do bond spreads respond less to changes in fundamentals? 
-  is the dispersion of spreads reduced for given creditworthiness? 
The first three tests are obvious. For given fundamentals, greater probability of getting 
IMF money reduces creditors’ expected losses. In the presence of creditor moral hazard, 
therefore, average bond spreads decrease – the more so, the higher the probability that a 
certain country is being bailed out should a crisis occur. Similarly, capital flows to emerging 
markets increase, especially to countries that are particularly likely of being bailed-out. 
Expectations of an IMF bailout should also increase the maturity structure of loans, since 
default risk is reduced. 
The other two tests for creditor moral hazard have been suggested by Dell’Arricia, 
Schnabel and Zettelmeyer (2002). If investors expect to be bailed-out, the risk premium they 
demand would depend on fundamentals to a lesser extent. In the extreme, when investors 
expect to be bailed out completely, fundamentals would have no impact on yields at all. The 
same argument makes bond-spreads less volatile for given dispersion in creditworthiness. As 
Dell’Arricia et al. (2002: 10) put it, “as investors pay less attention to differences in 
fundamentals across countries, the differences between country spreads should also narrow”. 
Conducting these tests, however, is not straightforward. The following sections deal 
with each of them in turn. 
   5
 
Reactions of spreads/ rates of return 
A first attempt to test for investor moral hazard is Zhang (1999), focusing on the IMF 
crisis package for Mexico in 1995. As described in the introduction, it has been argued that 
this IMF bailout was responsible for reduced spreads on emerging market bonds in late 1995 
to mid 1997. Zhang runs OLS regressions, employing two different datasets with quarterly 
average spreads on six Eurobonds and four Brady bonds from eight emerging markets 
countries over the period 1/1992-2/1997 as dependent variable. Controlling for changes in 
economic fundamentals and international capital market conditions his regression includes a 
dummy for the time of the Mexican crisis and, to test for long-run changes resulting from the 
IMF bailout, a dummy for the period from the fourth quarter of 1995 onwards. As the results 
from both datasets show that the coefficient of the post-crisis dummy is completely 
insignificant instead of being significantly negative, Zhang concludes that the observed 
decline in spreads has been a reaction to the increased liquidity in international capital 
markets and, to a lesser extent, to changes in fundamentals instead of being the consequence 
of moral hazard. 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000) analyze the impact of the IMF on the costs of 
borrowing for emerging market countries. They assembled a huge number of primary-market 
(launch) bonds spreads from Capital Bondware between the first quarter of 1991 and the 
fourth quarter of 1999. Since there is a sample selection problem (a country’s spread is only 
observed when it actually issues bonds) they estimate a Heckman selection model. In both the 
selection and the spreads equation, they include dummies for IMF programs and control for a 
huge number of fundamentals. Their results show that IMF programs have a positive impact 
on market access and reduce spreads. As the authors point out, this could either be because 
investors perceive conclusions of IMF programs as a commitment for reforms or because IMF 
lending creates moral hazard. The authors do not attempt to distinguish between the two 
effects. 
A second paper analyzing the behavior of bond spreads around the Mexican crisis is 
Kamin (2004). One of his tests is similar to that of Zhang. The dependent variable is the 
monthly change in J.P.Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) spread from March 
1992-November 2001. His OLS error-correction model takes the average credit rating of the 
included countries, U.S. corporate high-yield spreads and contemporaneous changes in U.S. 
treasury yields into account. As a test for moral hazard, Kamin uses his model to calculate the 
predicted value of the EMBI, so that the predicted parameters reflect the average behavior of 
spreads over the entire period. If moral hazard would be important, Kamin argues, the model   6
 
should over-predict spreads after 1994 and under-predict them before. As the model in fact 
predicts spreads to be higher than the actual levels before 1995, the moral hazard hypothesis 
is not supported by the data. 
Another attempt to measure whether the IMF induces moral hazard with investors in 
the long-rung has been made by Dell’Arricia et al. (2002). Although considering the Mexican 
crisis of 1995 and the Asian crisis of 1997/98 as well, their main focus is on the 1998 Russian 
crisis. As Dell’Arricia et al. argue, this non-bailout is well suited as a test for moral hazard, 
since it has been unexpected and, contrary to the Mexican crisis, did probably not change 
investors’ perceptions of market risks (After the Mexican and Asian crises, investors should 
have been aware of the risks associated with emerging market bonds. Moreover, Russia had 
been downgraded by major rating agencies in the first half of 1998). Their test for moral 
hazard is thus whether bond spreads increased after the Fund did not bail out Russia. They 
focus on two datasets: an unbalanced sample of launch spreads contained in Capital Data’s 
Bondware for 54 countries and the balanced panel of the EMBI Global secondary market 
spreads including 21 countries. Like Eichengreen and Mody (2000) they estimate a Heckman 
selection model for the launch spreads data to correct for sample selection. 
Dell’Arricia et al. employ a huge set of fundamentals in their regressions, including 
data on domestic economic conditions, external sector conditions, international interest rates, 
political variables, country characteristics and credit ratings. 
Since the levels of spreads rose sharply immediately after the crisis, assuming a stable 
relationship between fundamentals and bond spreads would bias the results in the direction of 
rejection of moral hazard. To test for the long-run impact of the IMF non-bailout, the period 
of financial turbulence was therefore omitted from the regressions. However, the results are 
robust to the choice of the exclusion window. 
Specifically, Dell’Arricia et al. estimate models for spreads of the pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods separately and compare the fitted spreads for each month in every country over 
the two models. Applying those tests to the Mexican and Asian crises did not produce 
evidence that moral hazard did increase. However, the results are quite supportive of the 
moral hazard hypothesis in the event of the Russian non-bailout: In a huge number of 
countries and periods, spreads estimated with the post-crises model are significantly higher 
compared to the pre-crisis model. This result is robust to the method of estimation and data 
used. 
Noy (2004) and Zoli (2004) recently applied variations of the test proposed by 
Dell’Arricia et al. While Noy confirms the earlier findings, Zoli reports opposite results. In   7
 
                                                
Noy (2004), four moral hazard-related groups of events are analyzed: The 1995 Mexican 
program; the Asian crisis/ introduction of SRF/ suggestion of quota increase; the 1998 quota 
increase/ 600 percent of quota program for Brazil; and the approval of the program with 
Argentina in 2000. Employing a panel of 15 EMBIplus countries, Noy explains (monthly) 
bond spreads by a range of macroeconomic variables over the years 1998-2000. After each 
event a four months window has been omitted from the regression. For these four months the 
model is employed to derive predicted values of the spreads, and the presence of moral hazard 
would lead to them being higher than the actual ones. As it turns out, however, predicted 
spreads are on average lower than actual spreads. The events under study do thus not seem to 
have increased moral hazard. To the contrary, repeating the analysis for the 1998 non-bailout 
of Russia confirms the results of Dell’Arricia et al. (2002). Zoli (2004) employs a larger 
sample of 32 countries, different control variables and allows for non-linear effects of a 
country’s outstanding official and officially guaranteed debt on the supply of capital. What 
she finds is, that moral hazard increased following the Mexican crisis, but did not decrease 
after the Russian non-bailout. Her results show that the impact of outstanding debt on spreads 
significantly differs in the post- as compared to the pre-crisis period, in the direction 
associated with moral hazard. Moreover, debtor countries do not seem to be credit constrained 
after the Mexican crisis, while they were before. 
Instead of focusing on long-term effects of IMF actions, Lane and Phillips (2000), 
McBrady and Seasholes (2000), Tillmann (2001), Haldane and Scheibe (2003) and Evrensel 
and Kutan (2004a) analyze the reactions of bond markets around the days of events 
potentially relevant for expectations about bailouts. Lane and Phillips focus on a large number 
of news relating to the potential size of IMF rescue packages, including the Mexican bailout, 
the Russian default, the increase in the access limit to IMF resources in 1994, the introduction 
of the Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF)
7 in 1997 and the increase in Fund quotas in 1999. 
Studying the short-term response of EMBI spreads and individual country’s spreads to those 
IMF-related news, they find little systematic evidence. Most of the events studied do not lead 
to statistically significant movements of spreads in the expected direction, the exception being 
the Russian default of 1998. However, as has been shown by Haldane and Scheibe (2003), 
those results depend on the choice of events. Focusing on a different (similarly large) set of 
 
7 This facility has been implemented to provide financial assistance to countries experiencing exceptional 
balance of payments difficulties due to a large short-term financing need resulting from a sudden and disruptive 
loss of market confidence.   8
 
                                                
IMF-related news, they report the opposite: In the majority of the cases, spreads move in the 
direction consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis, and in many cases economically 
significantly so. 
McBrady and Seasholes (2000) observe a significant increase in bond spreads after the 
bailing in of investors in Pakistan by the Paris Club in early 1999. Their paper examines the 
daily price movements of 402 different bonds from 2/24/1999-2/26/1999, when officials from 
Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance met with representatives of the Paris Club to negotiate a debt 
rescheduling arrangement. They regress the change in spreads over those three days on 
country-specific and bond-specific factors and find that larger undrawn ESAF
8 balances 
significantly reduce the increases of spread. Larger undrawn balances under the IMF’s Stand-
by and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) both lead to significantly larger increases in spreads.
9 
The authors’ explanation for their results is that the reduced probability of being bailed out 
makes the Fund’s general resources less valuable (thus decreasing moral hazard). In the case 
of the ESAF, however, funds devoted to poor countries cannot be withheld from them in the 
event of financial distress. Private bondholders can thus not be bailed in, making undrawn 
ESAF funds relatively more valuable to bondholders. 
Tillmann (2001) analyzes the response of risk premia to 42 IMF-related events. 
Specifically, he tests whether there is a structural break in the risk-return relationship in bond 
prices of emerging markets that coincides with IMF-news. Tillmann employs a Markov-
switching GARCH-M model to daily data of the EMBIplus over the period 1/1/1994-
11/2/2000. He includes dummies that are equal to one on the day the news appear and zero 
otherwise. 
If moral hazard is important, the price of risk should be lower when IMF bailouts 
become more likely. IMF lending should thus raise the probability of jumping to a regime that 
is characterized by a low price of risk. As the results show, IMF-related news do not raise the 
probability of switching to a state that can be associated with a moral hazard regime. 
 
8 The Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) provides concessional assistance to low-income 
countries. 
9 The Stand-By Arrangement is designed to address short-term balance-of-payments problems and is the most 
widely used facility of the IMF, the Extended Fund Facility supports medium-term programs.   9
 
                                                
Another recent attempt to analyze the importance of moral hazard in bond markets is 
Evrensel and Kutan (2004a).
10 They focus on country specific daily bond spreads of Indonesia 
(12/19/1996-2/27/2003) and Korea (5/17/1996-2/27/2003). As explanatory variables their 
analysis includes exchange rates and stock returns (both lagged by one day), U.S. corporate 
bond spreads, a dummy that equals one on the starting day of IMF program negotiations, a 
dummy that is one on the day of program approval, a dummy for the period between 
negotiations and approval, and a dummy for the entire program period. 
Estimating OLS and GARCH regressions, the authors find that program duration tends 
to increase spreads, which they take as evidence against moral hazard. To the contrary, 
spreads in both countries significantly declined on the starting day of the negotiations and the 
day of program approval giving support to the moral hazard hypothesis.
11  
To test whether country specific IMF-related news increase moral hazard in other 
countries, Evrensel and Kutan also include dummies for program approvals in countries other 
than Indonesia and Korea. The results show that these news do not decrease country spreads. 
Taken together, findings are far from being conclusive. What do these findings tell 
about the moral hazard-hypothesis? There are some problems. First, the studies of Lane and 
Phillips, MacBrady and Seasholes, Tillmann, and Evrensel and Kutan do not adequately 
control for other influences like changes in fundamentals, data on which are not available on a 
daily basis. For example, the only control variables Evrensel and Kutan include in their 
regressions are stock returns and the exchange rate. However, investor moral hazard might 
also exist with respect to equity markets (Section 2.2). Although data on stock returns are 
lagged by one day, they might be endogenous to bond spreads. Second, approval of an IMF 
lending program is usually associated with financial crisis. Crises change investors’ 
expectations about market risk. Any reduction in perceived risk through increased lending 
could thus easily be offset by an increase in perceived risk due to the crisis itself. Third, most 
of the analyzed events were probably not important enough to change perceptions about 
future bailouts. The announcement of increased financing for Indonesia in January 1998, for 
example, is unlikely to have had any significant influence on expectations about future IMF 
 
10 Evrensel and Kutan (2004a) base their analysis on research by Sarno and Taylor (1999), who have been the 
first to test for moral hazard in equity markets. Since Sarno and Taylor do not focus on the IMF, their study is 
not included in this review article. 
11 Similar results are reported by Ganapolsky and Schmuckler (2001) for Argentina where bond prices increased 
significantly after the announcement of an arrangement with the IMF in October 1995.   10
 
                                                
engagements in other countries. And fourth, changes in IMF policy might have been expected 
prior to official announcement. 
Evrensel and Kutan, moreover, base their analysis on two countries. However, there is 
no good reason to believe that the findings for Indonesia and Korea will hold in general. Also, 
why should non-exceptional news about IMF programs in other countries change investors’ 
perceptions about the likelihood of being bailed out in Indonesia and Korea? As another 
problem, they assume the coefficients of exchange rates and stock markets to be constant over 
time. However, IMF events inducing moral hazard with the investors would decrease the 
absolute magnitude of those coefficients (Dell’Arricia et al. 2002). Finally, it is not possible 
to distinguish the expected effects of the IMF arrangement for the program country from an 
increase in moral hazard. Although there is considerable evidence that IMF programs do 
generally not promote growth or growth oriented policies (Evrensel 2002, Przeworski and 
Vreeland 2000, Boockmann and Dreher 2003, Dreher 2004), investors might have expected 
the IMF programs and associated extremely detailed conditionality to alleviate the crises. 
Decreased spreads could thus reflect expected improvements in policy instead of being a 
signal of moral hazard.
12 
In summary, the studies focusing on short-term movements in bond markets did not 
shed much light on the moral hazard phenomenon. However, although more promising, there 
are some pitfalls with analyzing longer-term reactions as well. Employing dummies for IMF 
programs like Eichengreen and Mody did cannot solve the identification problem whether a 
reduction in spreads is due to moral hazard or to a reduction in real hazards of crises. Simply 
including event dummies in the regression is therefore no adequate test. This is especially true 
if the dummy is meant to capture changes in the degree of moral hazard but coefficients on 
fundamentals are assumed to be unchanged by the crisis. Indeed, it has been argued above 
that these coefficients would change in the presence of moral hazard. Moreover, the choice of 
events is critical for a meaningful test. As argued by Dell’Arricia et al. (2002: 8) the Mexican 
bailout is not well suited to test for the existence of moral hazard. The Mexican crisis 
probably increased the perceived riskiness of emerging market debt. This could have offset 
reductions in spreads due to moral hazard. The same is true for other events employed, e.g., 
by Noy (2004). 
 
12 In order to investigate this issue, Evrensel and Kutan (2004b) replicate their analysis for Indonesia, comparing 
the results with developments in the foreign exchange market. The results show that the forward exchange rate 
depreciates with the announcement of the IMF program, which, according to the authors, strengthens the moral 
hazard-interpretation of their results.   11
 
While Dell’Arricia et al. take most of those problems carefully into account, at least 
three problems remain. First, an IMF program could directly affect the probability of future 
financial crises if, e.g., the presence of the insurance reduces the probability of runs on a 
country’s currency or debt. Second, fundamentals which have been included to the 
regressions as exogenous variables might in fact also depend on expectations about the 
availability of IMF money (debtor moral hazard), making fundamentals endogenous to the 
model. And finally, the event window under study might be too long to attribute the observed 
impact (mainly) to the IMF-related event. In the case of the Russian non-bail-out, for 
example, the Long-Term-Capital-Management (LTCM) crisis and a general worsening of the 
world economic outlook fall in the period under study and might be responsible for the 
increased bond spreads (Noy 2004). 
Summarizing the evidence of the IMF’s impact on bond spreads, there seems to be 
some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that moral hazard has indeed been present in the 
bond markets prior to the Russian crises. Taking shortcomings of earlier work into account, 
Dell’Arricia et al. (2002) report evidence that the degree of moral hazard decreased after the 
Russian crises of 1998. Like most other studies they do not find an increase in moral hazard 
after the Mexican crisis in 1995. 
 
Reaction of flows to emerging markets/ financing of strategically important countries 
Mina and Martinez-Vasquez (2002) and Martinez-Vasquez and Mina (2003) propose 
to employ the maturity structure of a country’s loans to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. As 
the authors argue, lenders would reduce not only overall lending when their perceptions about 
default risk worsens but also shorten the maturity structure: “If expectations of an IMF bailout 
reduce investors’ risk perceptions and generate an increase in the maturity of international 
loans, then such reactions could reasonably be used as a measure for the existence of moral 
hazard” (Mina and Martinez-Vasquez 2002: 9). In testing whether the IMF’s effect on the 
maturity structure of loans has indeed been the consequence of moral hazard instead of 
improved fundamentals or the beneficial effect of commitment to reform, the OLS regressions 
include a large number of control variables. While Mina and Martinez-Vasquez (2002) focus 
on 71 countries over the period 1992-1997, Martinez-Vasquez and Mina (2003) analyze six 
Middle East and North African countries over the same period.
13 In both studies the IMF-
related variables are agreed credit as a percentage of GDP one year ahead, to account for 
                                                 
13 Note that in the later study sample size is too small for drawing rigorous conclusions.   12
 
investors’ expectations of a future bailout, and withdrawn IMF credit one year ahead, to 
account for investors’ expectations about the country’s commitment to the Fund’s reform 
program. The latter variable has been used in prior empirical research to proxy compliance 
with IMF conditionality (Killick 1995, Dreher 2003). As Killick (1995: 58) points out, credit 
agreed but left undrawn may be a useful indicator of performance under a program. After 
concluding an arrangement, part of the credit associated with it will be paid out immediately. 
The rest is payable in tranches. Since IMF credits are highly subsidized, countries have 
incentives to draw all the money available immediately. Only if non-compliance is prevalent, 
the IMF withholds part or all of the money. Withdrawn loans can thus proxy for lenders’ 
expectations whether the program country is committed to economic reform. 
As the results of both papers show, net flows of short-term foreign debt as a 
percentage of total external net debt flows are indeed influenced by the IMF. Expected IMF 
lending significantly reduces expected short-term debt flows in total flows after the Mexican 
crisis while it had no effect prior to 1995. This suggests that moral hazard has only been 
present in the post-bail-out period. A disaggregated analysis shows that Standby- and 
Extended Fund Facility Arrangements increase maturity, while the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility does not. The results also show that the commitment effect of IMF 
programs has little effect on debt structure. 
Kamin (2004) also estimates OLS regressions testing whether capital flows to 
emerging markets have been influenced by the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises. His 
dependent variable are quarterly log changes in capital flows (bonds and loans) from the first 
quarter of 1992 to the third quarter of 2001. In addition to the lagged dependent variable, the 
level of U.S. 3-month and 10-year Treasury yield, U.S. high-yield corporate spreads and a 
measure for economic growth of the G7, Kamin includes crisis dummies that equal one in the 
first two quarters of the crises and zero otherwise. Employing this model, he compares 
predicted capital flows with their actual values. For moral hazard to play a role, the model 
should over predict flows before 1994 and under predict them after the Mexican crisis. 
Applying this test, the results are quite supportive of the hypothesis that the Mexican crisis 
increased moral hazard while the Russian crisis decreased it: In both 1996 and 1997 capital 
flows are clearly higher than predicted values. 
If large and systemic countries are considered separately from the other countries, no 
clear pattern emerges. After the Mexican bailout there is no shift in capital flows to systemic 
countries, as one would expect under the moral hazard hypothesis.   13
 
Similar results emerge for bond spreads. Controlling for creditworthiness variables, 
Kamin examines whether certain types of countries exhibit lower spreads than others. To this 
end, he compares actual and fitted spreads for each country at 9/30/1997 and 9/29/2000. 
According to his results, there is no evidence that systemic countries pay lower spreads.  
Again, the results are far from being conclusive. With respect to capital flows, as 
Kamin himself admits, it is probably impossible to construct a rigorous test for moral hazard. 
Too many factors affect these flows that can not be controlled for. Also, the predictions of the 
models do not appear to be robust to changes in specifications, and include counterintuitive 
significant coefficients. Regarding the papers of Mina and Martinez-Vasquez, using actual 
values of the IMF variables one year ahead to proxy investors’ expectations is hard to justify. 
Although being instructive, these studies do neither provide compelling evidence in 
favor of nor against the moral hazard hypothesis.  
 
Relationship between spreads and fundamentals 
This test has been employed by Dell’Arricia et al. (2002), Kamin and Kleist (1999), 
Kamin (2004) and Lee and Shin (2004). Dell’Arricia et al. test whether bond spreads react 
differently to fundamentals after the Mexican, Asian and Russian crises. They thus estimate 
the effect of macroeconomic fundamentals on bond spreads before and after the crisis. If the 
non-bailout of Russia had indeed reduced moral hazard, the coefficients of the fundamentals 
would be greater in absolute magnitude. As it turns out, almost all coefficients change in the 
predicted direction after the Russian crisis, although only some of these changes are 
statistically significant. To the contrary, there is again no evidence that the Mexican and 
Asian crises increased moral hazard. 
With respect to the Mexican crisis, Kamin and Kleist (1999) and Kamin (2004) come 
to the same conclusion. They compare differences in simulated bond spreads for different 
credit-rating categories prior to the Mexican crisis and thereafter (taking a huge number of 
fundamental variables into account). Instead of observing those differences becoming smaller 
after the IMF bailout, differences actually increased suggesting that investors discriminate 
among risks more carefully than ever. 
However, as argued above, the Mexican crisis did probably act as a wake-up-call for 
investors leading them to reassess the risk of their emerging markets investments. According 
to Dell’Arricia et al. (2002), the Mexican crisis lead to a stronger discrimination against 
countries that earlier rescheduled their debt. Increased sensitivity to risk and greater 
discrimination could thus increase spreads, even if the degree of moral hazard increased   14
 
substantially. In fact, the results of Kamin show that spreads became quite concentrated by 
1997 and dispersed only after the Russian non-bailout, which perfectly fits with the moral 
hazard hypothesis. 
Recently, Lee and Shin (2004) proposed to differentiate among countries according to 
their likelihood to receive IMF loans should a crisis occur. Arguing along similar lines as the 
articles discussed in the previous sub-section, investors should react less sensitively to risk in 
countries where bail-outs are more likely. Focusing on monthly data for 16 EMBI Global 
countries over the periods 1/1998-12/2000, Lee and Shin test whether bond spreads of 
countries with better political connections to the Fund depend less on fundamentals.  In other 
words, if moral hazard prevails, we would expect the slope coefficient to be smaller the more 
likely a certain country is bailed-out by the Fund. 
To account for political connections, Lee and Shin (2004) employ the size of a 
country’s quota in the IMF, the size of its national staff at the Fund, and a proximity variable 
to the Fund’s major shareholders based on voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. 
Based on a regression over the five-year-period 1995-99, they predict the size of IMF loans to 
each sample country. They than estimate a similar regression as Dell’Arricia et al. (2002), but 
include an interaction term of each explanatory variable with the predicted loan size. As the 
results show, investors react less sensitively to fundamentals the higher the expected loan of 
the IMF.  
In comparing the results for the period prior to the Russian non-bailout (1/98-6/98) 
and those thereafter (4/99-12/2000), Lee and Shin do not find a general decrease in moral 
hazard. 
 
Volatility of spreads 
Dell’Arricia et al. (2002) test whether the Mexican, the Asian and the Russian crises 
have affected the variance of the spreads. Again they calculate fitted spreads using the 
coefficients estimated with pre-crisis and, respectively, post-crisis data. For each month they 
compare the variance of the fitted spreads for the pre-crisis with the post-crisis model and test 
whether the two fitted variances are significantly different from each other. For the Russian 
crisis, the post-crisis model significantly over-predicts the pre-crisis variance in every month, 
while the pre-crisis model always under-predicts the post-crisis variance. The Mexican and 
Asian crises, to the contrary, did not produce significant changes. Again the result for Mexico 
is probably due to increased perceived risk and greater discrimination among countries, 
whereas the Asian crisis did not lead to a reassessment of bailout probabilities.    15
 
 
2.2. Evidence from equity markets 
There are various studies testing for the impact of the IMF on stock markets. 
Ganapolsky and Schmukler (2001) report that the 1995 agreement between Argentina and the 
IMF significantly increased stock market returns. Hayo and Kutan (2003) find that “positive” 
IMF news increase daily stock returns by about one percentage point. According to Brealey 
and Kaplanis (2004), asset prices decline substantially in the weeks leading up to the 
announcement of IMF involvement without reversing after agreement has been reached. With 
respect to bank stocks, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1993) report that official loans and 
increases in resources available to multilateral lending agencies increase bank shareholders’ 
wealth. As one example, at the time of the US proposal to significantly increase its quota in 
the IMF in 1983, bank stock market capitalization increased substantially. Kho and Stulz 
(1999) find that the IMF program with Korea in 1997 increased bank shareholders’ wealth at 
the U.S. banks with the highest exposure to Korea, while IMF involvement with other Asian 
countries did have little effect. Kho, Lee and Stulz (1999) report that banks with exposure to a 
crisis country are positively affected by bailouts. Lau and McInish (2003) show that the 
announcement of an IMF rescue package increases stock prices of banks in countries 
receiving the bailout, but not in other countries. None of these studies, however, tries to 
separate the effects of an increase in moral hazard from a decrease in real hazards of crises 
(and none of them tries to explicitly test the moral hazard hypothesis). In the following I 
summarize the two papers themselves interpreting their analysis as tests for moral hazard. 
The first paper explicitly trying to disentangle moral and real hazards in equity 
markets is Haldane and Scheibe (2003). Haldane and Scheibe propose an indirect way of 
testing for moral hazard. They analyze how the (daily) share prices of seven UK banks with 
significant exposure to emerging markets change to IMF-related news between 1995-2002. 
As a condition for moral hazard, the authors argue, positive IMF-related news would have to 
increase the values of the banks’ outstanding loans and thus the value of their stocks. Since 
investors react to incentives, this would then prompt moral hazard and induce lending to risky 
emerging markets in the future. Haldane and Scheibe find that the market value of the seven 
banks does indeed rise after the majority of the 26 IMF-related events included in their 
sample. Employing pooled time-series cross-section regressions, they show that “positive” 
IMF news significantly 
-  increase the absolute value of stocks, 
-  increase the return on banks’ stocks in excess over market returns, and   16
 
-  increase the value of stocks the more, the higher the banks’ exposure to emerging 
markets. 
Conducting these tests, the authors look at cumulated stock returns over a five-day 
period around an IMF-related event. To measure excess returns, they control for the 
percentage change in the overall UK equity market index. Obviously, an increase in returns 
could also be due to improved fundamentals following an IMF intervention. To distinguish 
this reduction in real hazard from increased moral hazard, the regressions include country and 
emerging markets spreads proxying for a potentially reduced risk of default. In attributing 
reductions in spreads completely to improved fundamentals, the authors argue, their test is 
biased against finding moral hazard, so strengthening their results. In their interpretation, the 
fact that high exposure to emerging markets at the time of “positive” IMF-news increases 
excess returns provides additional evidence for the moral hazard hypothesis: Investors expect 
future bailouts to increase the value of banks’ outstanding loans which increases the value of 
banks’ stocks. Again, changed incentives would then induce those banks to increase their 
exposure to emerging markets. 
If one accepts Haldane and Scheibe’s proposal as being a test of moral hazard with 
creditors, the above mentioned studies by Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (1993), Kho and 
Stulz (1999) and Kho, Lee and Stulz (1999) provide additional insights. These studies present 
some evidence that IMF bailouts increase the value of bank stocks which, according to 
Haldane and Scheibe would imply moral hazard. The same is true for the results of Lau and 
McInish (2003), showing that IMF bailout announcements have a positive impact on domestic 
banks’ stock prices in the countries receiving the bailout. Contrary to the moral hazard-
hypothesis, however, these bailouts do not increase stock prices of banks in other countries.  
Another test for moral hazard has recently been suggested by Evrensel and Kutan 
(2004c). As in their study of moral hazard in the bond market (Evrensel and Kutan 2004a), 
they estimate time-series GARCH regressions with daily observations from 6/1/1992-
12/27/2002. They test whether IMF-related events in Thailand, Korea and Indonesia 
(announcement of negotiations with the Fund, program approvals and duration of 
negotiations) affect stock returns in Indonesia and Korea. Their results for Korea and, to a 
lesser extent, Indonesia are in line with the hypothesis that the IMF provided investors with an 
implicit bailout guarantee (or at least that investors perceived the IMF engagement to partly 
guarantee their investment). Stock returns in Korea significantly increased after “positive” 
IMF-news from Thailand and Indonesia and both with the announcement of negotiations and   17
 
program approval in Korea itself. Indonesian stock returns increased significantly as its own 
program negotiation with the Fund has been announced. 
Although an interesting approach to testing for moral hazard, the authors, as they 
themselves admit, cannot solve the identification problem whether IMF interventions indeed 
induce moral hazard or capture changes in real risk. Moreover, in order to create moral 
hazard, creditors would have to expect the governments of the crisis country to use part of the 
IMF money to support companies, thus raising their share prices. Although this might 
exceptionally be the case, for example if there are close ties between government and private 
companies, an implicit guarantee is much more straightforward for commercial banks or 
holders of sovereign bonds. Positive IMF news might thus just have increased investors’ 
confidence in reforms instead of being a signal of moral hazard. 
In Evrensel and Kutan (2004d) the exercise is repeated for Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand, employing the same method and focusing on the same period of time, but analyzing 
financial stocks only. According to the authors, moral hazard would be indicated by a decline 
in financial stock market returns. This is based on two assumptions. First, prior to the IMF 
arrangement the highly distorted financial sector yields excess profits because it is protected 
by the countries’ elites. Second, the IMF program, aiming at restructuring the financial sector 
increases efficiency and therefore, at least in the short-run decreases (excess) profits. If the 
IMF program is believed to be unsuccessful, however, markets believe distortions (and thus 
excess profits) to prevail. Demand for financial stocks would rise, increasing returns. 
Again the results are broadly in line with the moral hazard-hypothesis: Financial sector 
returns in Thailand increase by 1.2 percent on the day the program is approved. In Indonesia, 
there is an increase in returns of about half a percentage point on the day of the program 
approval, while the increase in Korea amounts to 7.4 percent. 
The problems with this approach are obvious. As the authors concede, increasing stock 
market returns after program approval allows alternative interpretations. Investors might 
believe in the effectiveness of the IMF program. Instead of expecting the reforms in the 
financial sector to decrease stock market returns, however, they could equally well expect the 
efficiency gains to generate additional profits. The result of this study completely depends on 
investors expecting credible IMF programs to reduce (short-term) returns in the financial 
sector and incredible programs to increase them – an assumption that might or might not hold. 
Clearly, the authors’ argumentation in Evrensel and Kutan (2004c) is to some extent 
inconsistent with this assumption. Even if the investors do expect credible reforms, the money   18
 
disbursed under the IMF program could be used to bail-out the financial sector, increasing 
stock market returns. 
 
3. Does the IMF cause moral hazard with debtors? 
A first paper testing for direct moral hazard is Evrensel (2002) focusing on periods 
that are not associated with an IMF program and are located between two different programs 
in the same country (“inter-program-periods”). Similarly, Evrensel and Kim (2004) explain 
inter-program-periods for 91 countries over the years 1967-96. If IMF programs would induce 
moral hazard with the borrower, one would expect macroeconomic policies to worsen in 
inter-program-periods because otherwise the country could not negotiate additional programs. 
As Evrensel (2002) shows over the period 1971-97 for a sample of 42 countries for which two 
inter-program-periods are available, macroeconomic performance has been significantly 
worse in the second inter-program-period as compared to the first. According to the results, 
budget deficits, inflation rates and domestic credit, among others, are higher, while 
international reserves are smaller. Evrensel and Kim (2004) find that macroeconomic policies 
can explain the duration of the period a country is without an IMF program and interpret this 
as evidence in favor of moral hazard. 
Clearly, these articles do not account for external shocks, which might have created 
the same results. It is therefore not obvious whether the worsening of macroeconomic policies 
is really due to the influence of the IMF. Also, the sample size in Evrensel (2002) is rather 
small. While Evrensel and Kim (2004) show that macroeconomic policies significantly 
influence the duration of inter-program-periods, they do not test whether these policies are 
pursued because IMF programs are available should a crisis occur. Their result is thus a 
necessary condition for moral hazard, but by no means a sufficient one. 
Dreher and Vaubel (2004) propose a more direct test. They run pooled time-series 
cross-section regressions with 94 countries over the years 1975-97. The test for moral hazard 
proposed by Dreher and Vaubel is whether the policies causing financial crises are at least 
partially due to the influence of the IMF. Accordingly, they explain fiscal and monetary 
policy by the amount of credit available. If the availability of IMF money induces moral 
hazard with the borrower, fiscal and monetary policy should be more expansive, the higher 
the amount of IMF credit available at the beginning of the year relative to the country's quota. 
The amount of credit available measures the quantity dimension of moral hazard 
generated by the IMF: as the country’s quota is increasingly exhausted and, by implication, 
the quantity of additional credit available from the IMF diminishes, the incentive to pursue   19
 
                                                
excessive policy declines. Conversely, moral hazard increases if the country repays its credit 
to the IMF or if IMF quotas are raised. 
The term “moral hazard” is sometimes also used in a wider sense describing an 
incentive to abuse the claim to an indemnity once the accident has occurred or an incentive to 
abuse a loan which ought to be, but may not be, repaid. To allow for the possibility of such 
abuse, budget deficits and monetary expansion are also regressed on the amount of new 
credit, which the country has received from the IMF during the previous year relative to its 
GDP. Officially, IMF conditionality is supposed to prevent the recipient country from 
embarking on over expansionary policies. However, it has been shown by various studies that 
the Fund’s conditionality is rather unsuccessful.
14 
Controlling for the rate of real GDP growth, the inflation rate and a variable measuring 
election dates, Dreher and Vaubel find that budget deficits and the rate of monetary expansion 
significantly fall as the country’s quota with the Fund is exhausted, while there appears to be 
no clear pattern for actual credits. When potential endogeneity of the regressors is controlled 
for, however, budget deficits indeed rise with IMF money received, also giving support to the 
hypothesis of moral hazard in the wider sense. 
While those results are clearly in line with the moral hazard hypothesis, they could 
also reflect successful crisis management. The degree of borrowing against the country's 
quota with the IMF could thus be an indicator of the degree of implementation of the 
conditionality attached to (possibly successive) IMF programs (Conway 2004). As Jeanne and 
Zettelmeyer (2004) point out, it is the intended purpose of the Fund allowing crises countries 
more expansionary policies than they could pursue without the IMF. Whether the results of 
Dreher and Vaubel indicate moral hazard depends thus on whether policies would be 
inefficiently tight in the absence of the IMF. 
Gai and Taylor (2004) analyze whether the introduction of the New Arrangements to 
Borrow (NAB)
15 and the Supplemental Reserve Facility changed the incentives of debtor 
countries to turn to the Fund. They construct an index of systemic importance, comprising the 
size of a country’s outstanding international debt securities, bank’s foreign claims on the 
country and its trade with the rest of the world. This is meant to capture the risk of contagion 
which is greater, the more important a country is in the international capital markets, the 
 
14 Joyce (2004) provides an excellent overview. See also Dreher (2003, 2004) and Joyce (2003). 
15 The NAB are a set of credit arrangements between the IMF and 26 members and institutions to provide 
supplementary resources to the IMF if necessary to deal with a threat to the stability of the international 
monetary system.   20
 
larger international banks’ exposure to the country and the greater its importance in 
international trade. Since NAB and SRF have been designed to contain the systemic impact of 
crises, the authors suggest this index of systemic importance to measure the perceived 
likelihood of being able to draw upon IMF resources in times of crisis: The more “systemic” a 
country, the more it should expect deriving benefits from NAB and SRF. This would lower 
pre-cautionary measures and thus increase Fund involvement. As the data suggest, the 
introduction of the SRF indeed increased the frequency of program participation, the more so, 
the more “systemic” a country. 
To rigorously test for moral hazard, Gai and Taylor employ a balanced panel 
consisting of quarterly observations for 19 countries over the period 1/1995-4/2001. Their 
dependent variable takes the value of one if a country is under an IMF program in a certain 
quarter and draws upon IMF resources during the arrangement. Controlling for fundamental 
variables likely to influence the decision to turn to the Fund, the authors find that the 
introduction of NAB and SRF increased the probability of turning to the Fund, especially for 
countries of systemic importance. Moreover, for the more “systemic” countries the 
introduction weakened the impact of the included fundamental variables on the probability of 
program participation. 
The authors identify the following problems with their analysis: First, their test is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for moral hazard. Second, they could only estimate a 
reduced form and are thus not able to disentangle demand and supply side factors. Third, the 
construction of the index of systemic importance is rather subjective. And finally, their results 
could be driven by a general structural break at the end of the nineties. As an additional 
problem, if the increased insurance cover would induce greater risk taking by the 
governments, fundamental variables employed as exogenous regressors (like the amount of 
international reserves) would in fact be endogenous. 
 
4. Summary 
This paper provides a critical overview of empirical studies on IMF induced moral 
hazard. With respect to the creditor moral hazard hypothesis, the evidence is far from being 
conclusive. Some of the studies reviewed in the paper encompass serious methodological 
problems, challenging their results. The empirical evidence shows that the results crucially 
depend on the choice of events. However, taken together, there is considerable evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis that the safety net provided by the IMF creates significant moral 
hazard with investors.   21
 
Whether IMF bailouts lead to moral hazard with debtor governments has so far been 
investigated by a small number of studies only, all finding evidence of moral hazard. If it is 
true that the IMF induces moral hazard with creditors and debtors, most studies for creditor 
moral hazard, taking fundamentals as given, suffer from endogeneity problems. While, for 
example, a higher probability of IMF lending would ceteris paribus increase investor moral 
hazard and thus decrease bond spreads, debtor moral hazard might at the same time increase, 
making policies worse and implying an increase in spreads. If IMF lending induces moral 
hazard with investors and debtors, the influence on spreads could be in either way. They 
could cancel each other out (Lee and Shin 2004). To test for creditor and debtor moral hazard 
simultaneously remains an interesting question for future research. 
The empirical literature on moral hazard has been challenged by Jeanne and 
Zettelmeyer (2004) for not distinguishing efficiency-enhancing from inefficient moral hazard. 
Under certain assumptions, IMF-induced moral hazard might increase world welfare. 
Specifically, when debtor countries’ governments act in the best long-run interest of their 
taxpayers and loans are repaid, lower spreads, higher capital inflows, and more expansive 
policies might be optimal. Clearly, the assumptions of governments maximizing the welfare 
of their taxpayers (instead of their own) is debatable. This could be tested by analyzing 
whether the IMF leads to redistribution at the expense of the average taxpayer (Jeanne and 
Zettelmeyer 2004). The test could also focus on the IMF’s impact on the probability to 
experience economic crises. It would be hard to argue that increased capital flows and 
expansive policies increase efficiency if they significantly increase the risk of economic 
crises. The “efficiency” of moral hazard remains as another interesting question for future 
research.   22
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Table 1: Overview of Studies on Moral Hazard     
Study            Period Sample Focus Result*
Zhang (1999)  1/1992-2/1997, 
quarterly 
6 Eurobonds, 4 Brady 
bonds 
Bond spreads  No evidence of moral 
hazard 
Eichengreen and Mody 
(2000) 
1/1991-4/1999, 
quarterly 
Bondware    Bond  spreads Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Lane and Phillips 
(2000) 
1995-1999, daily  EMBIplus  Bond spreads  No evidence of moral 
hazard, except for 
Russian non-bailout 
McBrady and 
Seasholes (2000) 
2/24/1999-2/26/1999, 
daily 
402 Bonds  Bond spreads  Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Tillmann (2001)  1/1/1994-11/2/2000, 
daily 
EMBIplus  Bond spreads  No evidence of moral 
hazard 
Dell’Ariccia, Schnabel 
and Zettelmeyer (2002) 
1998-2000, daily  EMBI Global (21 
countries) and 
Bondware (54 
countries) 
Bond spreads  Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Evrensel (2002)  1971-97, yearly      42  countries Macroeconomic
Policy 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Mina and Martinez-
Vasquez (2002) 
1992-97, yearly  71 countries  Maturity structure 
of loans 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Mina and Martinez-
Vasquez (2003) 
1992-97, yearly  6 MENA countries  Maturity structure 
of loans 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Haldane and Scheibe 
(2003) 
1995-2002, daily  7 UK banks  Stock returns of 
creditor banks 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Gai and Taylor (2004)  1/1995-4/2001, 
quarterly 
19 countries  Probability of IMF 
programs 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Kamin (2004)  3/1992-11/2001, 
monthly 
EMBI Bond  spreads,
capital flows 
  Consistent with moral 
hazard between 1995-
1998 but not thereafter 
  
Table 1 (continued)        
            Study Period Sample Focus Result
Dreher and Vaubel 
(2004) 
1975-97, yearly  94 countries  Budget deficit and 
monetary expansion 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Evrensel and Kutan 
(2004a) 
12/19/1996-2/27/2003 
and 5/17/1996-
2/27/2003, daily 
Indonesia and Korea  Bond spreads Consistent  with  moral
hazard 
 
Evrensel and Kutan 
(2004c) 
6/1/1992-12/27/2002, 
daily 
Indonesia and Korea  Stock returns    Consistent  with  moral
hazard 
Evrensel and Kutan 
(2004d) 
6/1/1992-12/27/2002, 
daily 
Indonesia, Korea and 
Thailand 
Stock returns in the 
financial sector 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Lee and Shin (2004)  1/1998-12/2000, 
monthly 
EMBI Global (16 
countries) 
Bond spreads  Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Evrensel and Kim 
(2004) 
1967-96, yearly  91 countries  Macroeconomic 
Policy 
Consistent with moral 
hazard 
Zoli (2004)  1993-2000, quarterly  32 countries        Bond  spreads Consistent with
(limited) moral hazard 
Noy (2004)  1/1994-12/2000, 
monthly 
EMBIplus (15 
countries) 
Bond spreads  No evidence of moral 
hazard 
 
* The result is based on the authors’ own judgment. 
 